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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental precept of American law and jurisprudence is
that "laws must change to meet the needs of changing times."' In
particular, the common law system of judging was thought to consti-
tute a uniquely effective mechanism for dealing with the demands
posed by rapid change. As Guido Calabresi presciently has observed,
during the nineteenth century judges "creatively manipulated and
changed common law rules in reaction to changing circumstances,"
and thereby "the common law was openly and legitimately kept up to
date."2 But, as Dean Calabresi has observed, times have changed.
The United States has become a nation dominated by statutes rather
than by common law rules.3
With the emergence of statutes has come the need to cope with
the problem of statutory obsolescence in order to retain some of the
flexibility and dynamism achieved through the process of common
law judging. Scholars have suggested a wide variety of strategies for
dealing with statutory obsolescence. Sunset laws, which would limit
the time period for which statutes are in force,' increased constitu-
tional scrutiny,5 judicial updating,6 and even direct majoritarianism7
all have been proposed as mechanisms for dealing with the problem of
obsolescence. Thus, for example, Dean Calabresi recommends giving
common law courts the power to treat statutes precisely the way they
treat common law rules."
This Article does not attempt to add to the rich literature on
statutory obsolescence. Rather, its goal is to observe that the twenti-
eth century has witnessed the birth of another phenomenon-the
modem administrative agency-whose existence presents problems of
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University.
GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 3 (1982).
2 Id. at 184.
3 Id. passim.
4 Id. at 59-65.
5 Id. at 8-15.
6 Id. at 81.
7 Id. at 70-72.
8 See id. at 82.
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obsolescence and irrelevance even more profound than the problems
posed by the existence of outdated statutes. The problem with agen-
cies is basically the same as with statutes: what happens when techno-
logical change, market processes, or other exogenous variables cause
the basic purposes of an administrative agency to cease to be relevant
from the perspective of the public policies that originally led to the
creation of the agency?
Put another way, the problem can be stated as follows: "an un-
mistakable function of both the dependent and the independent agen-
cies, as conceived in the New Deal, was to give specificity to broad
legislative mandates." 9 But it stands to reason that when these man-
dates have been attained, or are no longer relevant, or when the goals
set for the agency can be achieved through market forces without the
need for agency intervention, the agency should cease to exist.
Part I of this Article considers the problem of administrative
agency obsolescence in more detail. In Part I, I develop general prin-
ciples and guidelines for determining obsolescence that might permit
judges to evaluate a claim that an administrative agency should be
closed down. In Part II of the Article, I apply the principles of
agency obsolescence developed in Part I to a particular administrative
agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission").
I. THE PROBLEM OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OBSOLESCENCE
In the private sector, firms are motivated to provide products at
competitive prices by the threat of financial loss, which, at the limit,
means failure. The role of failure in a market economy is clear: when
a firm misuses scarce resources by "producing unwanted products, or
overproducing, or using inefficient production techniques, at the ex-
treme it will fail, and the resources will find more socially desirable
uses."10 In a market economy, it is common for individual businesses
to fail. Indeed, it is not uncommon for entire industries to fail. Firms
fail for one of two reasons: "either the firm has not responded to mar-
ket forces with a satisfactory mix of price and product performance
relative to its competitors in the industry, or else the product the firm
is offering is not in sufficient demand by consumers to justify its pro-
duction in the first place.""
Because this Article is not about the efficient operation of admin-
9 Id. at 45.
10 A. Dale Tussing, The Case For Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & ECON. 129, 129 (1967).
11 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Mar-
ket for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1988).
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istrative agencies, I will not discuss strategies for improving the qual-
ity of the services offered by administrative agencies to the public.
Rather, this Article is about the consequences and cures of adminis-
trative agency obsolescence. My argument is not that administrative
agencies should be closed merely because they are being operated inef-
ficiently. Inefficient operations can, in principle, be improved by
changing incentive structures and personnel. Rather, my argument is
that just as technological innovations in markets often cause whole
industries to become obsolete-for example, the introduction of the
automobile had disastrous consequences for the buggy whip indus-
try-so too can technological innovation render administrative agen-
cies obsolete.
The problem of market failure provides the basic public-interest
justification for the displacement of private ordering by government
intervention. Market failure occurs when market mechanisms do not
supply the appropriate quantity of a product or service at the appro-
priate price. The identification of a market failure provides a neces-
sary but not a sufficient condition for justifying the imposition of
government regulation. But market failures can be cured.
Moreover, the mere identification of a market failure is not suffi-
cient to justify government regulation, because such regulation in-
volves costs as well as benefits. The costs are not only the direct costs
of government regulation, such as bureaucrats' salaries, etc., but also
the indirect costs in the form of the rigidities and barriers to entry
caused by government regulation. Thus, those seeking to justify gov-
ernment regulation should presumably be required to show that the
costs of the government regulatory scheme are outweighed by the
benefits. The identification of a public good (i.e., a good from which
those who do not pay for the good cannot be excluded from using it)
might suggest a role for government in supplying that good if there is
sufficient demand for it. Similarly, the existence of collective action
problems provides a partial basis for justifying government interven-
tion. For example, all of the members of a particular society might
prefer to agree to provide transfer payments to the poorest members
of the society. However, each individual member of that society
might recognize that, acting individually, she could do little to benefit
the poor. Moreover, each individual in the society would realize that
the poor would not be noticeably affected if that individual alone de-
clined to contribute to the poor, so long as all of the other members
continued to participate. This collective action problem might well
lead to a situation in which giving to the poor was suboptimal, even
from the perspective of the well-to-do within the society. Govern-
1994]
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mentally coerced transfer payments could be used to solve this prob-
lem by eliminating the free rider possibilities described above.
But again, it stands to reason that just as justifications arise for
creating governmental programs, these justifications might also sub-
side over time. In particular, market innovations that solve public
good and collective action problems can be developed. For example,
suppose that a particular production process is developed which pro-
duces a good very cheaply, but results in a great deal of pollution.
The existence of pollution creates a cost that is not internalized by the
producer of the good. In this circumstance, one might argue in favor
of a tax on the producer that raises the price of the good to the price
that would be charged if the producer had to bear the cost of its pollu-
tion. Alternatively, one might argue in favor of a regulation that
reduces production to the level that would exist if the producer had to
internalize the costs of its pollution. But these regulatory policies
should be abandoned if new techniques are developed that permit
more efficient production without pollution.
At the limit, it is easy to identify examples of obsolescence. The
Rural Electrification Administration ("REA") was established to
bring electricity to remote agricultural areas during the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s. At the time the Administration was created, about
eighty percent of farms did not have electricity. Now, one hundred
percent have electricity. So, the REA shifted its focus to the provi-
sion of telephone service. Now one hundred percent of farms also
have telephone service, but the REA continues to provide subsidized
loans to its well-organized constituencies, which consist primarily of
utility companies providing electric and telephone services to rural
areas. 12
A. The Nature of the Problem: Why Agency Obsolescence Matters
As noted above, failure plays an important and salutary role in
the operation of market economies. The presence of failure assures
that the resources previously devoted to the enterprise will find other,
more efficient uses. The same, of course, can be said for the problem
of agency obsolescence. By terminating the operations of an adminis-
trative agency, it is possible to divert the resources previously devoted
to the operations of that agency to other, more valuable uses. Thus,
terminating the operations of an obsolescent agency will produce net
social gains.
12 Milton Friedman, The Real Free Lunch: Markets and Private Property, CATO POL'Y
REP., July-Aug. 1993, at 1.
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The existence of failing institutions, whether such institutions are
in the public sector or the private sector, may be a sign of health
rather than a sign of malaise since it indicates that either innovation
or competition is serving to remove the need for the obsolete firms or
agencies.' 3 Indeed, it would be extremely disappointing if administra-
tive agencies never became obsolete, since it would mean that the soci-
etal problems such institutions ostensibly were organized to confront
were never solved.
For several reasons, the problem of administrative agency obso-
lescence has more serious consequences than either the problem of
statutory obsolescence or the problem of obsolescence in private sec-
tor firms. The problem of agency obsolescence is more serious than
the problem of statutory obsolescence because judges can and do up-
date obsolete statutes by interpreting them in ways that preserve their
usefulness through time. 4 In other words, statutes are sufficiently
flexible that they can be altered, or "interpreted dynamically," to in-
sure that they remain relevant.' 5
By contrast, when administrative agencies become obsolete, they
are likely to respond to their obsolescence in ways that impose very
heavy costs on the firms they are supposed to regulate, or on society
generally, or both. As obsolescence sets in, administrative agencies
are likely to replace the publicly articulated goals that provided the
initial justification for the creation of the agency with self-serving
goals designed to insure that the agency will remain a secure place of
employment for the officials who comprise its staff. As Anthony
Downs pointed out in his classic work Inside Bureaucracy, over time,
all bureaucracies will substitute private, bureaucratic objectives for
the public objectives that characterized their origination. 16 But it
seems clear that this general problem becomes worse in the case of
agencies facing obsolescence, since obsolescence makes the problem of
bureaucratic self-interest far more immediate. Thus, it stands to rea-
son that agency officials faced with the prospect of losing their jobs,
and with them their large highly specific investments in human capi-
tal that have been devoted to learning agency policies, agency proce-
dures, and agency culture, will fight hard to avoid that outcome.
For example, agencies that are faced with obsolescence are more
likely to become "captured" by a particular segment of the industry
than agencies that are not faced with obsolescence. This is because
13 See Macey & Miller, supra note 11, at 1155.
14 See CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 81-83.
15 Id. at 31-43.
16 ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).
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agencies that are not obsolete often can count on some significant
measure of public support for their continued existence. By contrast,
an agency that has been rendered obsolete by exogenous changes in
the form of technological development or new marketplace develop-
ments will find that it must provide favors to discrete constituencies in
order to preserve some measure of support for its continued existence.
In addition to the fact that it may be easier for special interest
groups to capture obsolete agencies than other agencies, obsolete
agencies are also more likely to engage in bureaucratic struggles com-
monly characterized as "turf wars" than other agencies. Again, this
prediction is consistent with my prediction that survival will become
the central institutional focus for obsolete administrative agencies.
An obsolete agency will attempt to retain some justification for its
existence by claiming that areas of economic life that either currently
are unregulated, or else currently are under the regulatory authority
of a rival agency, should be brought under the authority of the obso-
lete agency.
Bureaucratic imperialism by obsolete agencies creates several
kinds of problems. First, imperialistic agencies waste real resources
by attempting to do work that currently is being accomplished, either
by private sector actors or by other governmental agencies. Second,
imperialistic agencies cause overregulation. Overregulation is caused
by the fact that obsolete agencies seeking to expand their regulatory
turf will attempt to regulate in areas that Congress had intended to
leave unregulated. Moreover, in looking for new worlds to conquer,
obsolete agencies inevitably will claim that "rival" regulatory agencies
are not providing the public with sufficient regulatory protection in
order to provide a justification for their efforts to expand their own
jurisdiction. This, in turn, leads to overregulation.
I hasten to add, however, that bureaucratic efforts to claim new
turf are not always met with hostility and opposition by the firms they
are attempting to regulate. Rather, firms in a particular industry
often will welcome new regulatory efforts, particularly those proposed
by an administrative agency made desperate by obsolescence. This is
because new regulation can protect existing firms by creating barriers
to entry. New regulation also can provide benefits for certain seg-
ments of an industry, such as established firms over other firms, par-
ticularly newer firms.17 Thus, as with agency capture, agency
17 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3 (1971).
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imperialism can be used by an agency to obtain much needed political
support in the face of obsolescence.
In addition to the problems associated with bureaucratic capture
and bureaucratic imperialism described above, a third set of social
problems is caused by the strong incentives of obsolete agencies to
disrupt and distort the creation and flow of information to the public
regarding the firms it is supposed to regulate. Obviously, administra-
tive agencies that lack any reason for existing are unlikely to admit
the fact of their own obsolescence. Rather, they are more likely to
skew the flow of relevant information to the public in order to make it
seem as though problems that would serve to justify their existence
still remain.
Moreover, administrative agencies often are organized to deal
with real or perceived crises or with problems of apparently major
proportions. Indeed, administrative agencies can only justify their
huge staffs and significant budgets if they can persuade people that
they are dealing with problems of significant proportions. Thus, not
only do administrative agencies have an incentive to manufacture
facts that would tend to support their continued existence, they also
have an incentive to invent major crises and problems in order to at-
tempt to make the "solution" of these crises and problems a way to
justify their continued existence.
Similarly, bureaucrats in obsolete agencies have an incentive to
deny that solutions to crises and problems exist outside the agencies
themselves. For example, it is clear that the U.S. Postal Service has
no incentive to admit that solutions generated by markets and new
technologies, such as electronic mail, faxes, and Federal Express, have
caused an erosion in the need for the postal service to continue to exist
as a federally subsidized bureaucracy.
Thus far I have used economic analysis in the form of public
choice theory to make predictions about how obsolete agencies are
likely to act. These predictions strongly suggest that obsolete agencies
are even less likely to advance the public interest than agencies that
are not obsolete. The public choice model I am using in my analysis
has been criticized for advancing a theory that "posits hyper-rational
agency action." 8 For example, in an interesting essay about the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, Donald Langevoort argues that
the assumption of hyperrationality that underlies public choice theory
makes
the theory's descriptive power ... seem questionable in its applica-
18 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric,
and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 529 (1990).
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tion to the actions of administrative agencies, for there is both
abundant anecdotal evidence and a vast body of research on orga-
nizational behavior that argues that the activity of bureaucracies is
not characterized by a high degree of either sensitivity or respon-
siveness to external stimuli.' 9
In particular, the literature from organizational theory that
Langevoort cites argues that internal institutional biases towards
"conservatism, risk avoidance, 'turf protection,' and routine" also
serve to explain administrative agency behavior in important ways.2 °
Despite obvious overlaps and similarities between public choice the-
ory and organizational theory, there is a clear tension between the two
theories that is easy to describe. Where public choice posits that bu-
reaucrats within administrative agencies seek to maximize the welfare
of the institution according to criteria that are easy to measure exter-
nally (agency budgets, agency power, agency influence), organiza-
tional theory posits that the internal institutional biases described
above provide the best criteria for predicting agency behavior.
Of course, to the extent that public choice theory and organiza-
tional theory presume that the bureaucrats inside agencies respond to
incentives, the two theories are consistent both with standard eco-
nomic theory and with each other.
Moreover, it stands to reason that the distinction between the
internal incentives described in organizational theory and the external
incentives described in public choice theory become blurred when an
agency's very existence is threatened by obsolescence. For example,
the reason organizational theory predicts that bureaucrats will avoid
risk is because personnel are punished for making bad decisions but
not rewarded for making good decisions. As Professor Langevoort
has pointed out, "agency staffs rarely are rewarded for successes such
as the anticipation and prevention of a problem or the efficient bal-
ance of costs and benefits of a particular rule, but inevitably blamed
for publicly observed failures within their jurisdictions."'" But bu-
reaucrats threatened with extinction from obsolescence are unlikely to
be risk avoiders where the risks are taken in order to protect their
sinecures. Here, blame avoidance clearly will be less important than
survival.
Organizational theory also predicts that collective action prob-
lems will cause bureaucrats within agencies to ignore external incen-
tives that otherwise would cause the agency to seek to expand its own
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 530.
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power and to pursue other discrete, organizationally-directed objec-
tives. Langevoort, for example, has criticized public choice theory on
these grounds.2 2 He notes that the external, institutional goals that
public choice theory predicts will inform the objective functions of
administrative agencies are not as influential as internal organiza-
tional goals. These latter goals include "enlarged or preserved turf or
budget, more leisure time for the staff,"' 23 and "even the sense of pride
or satisfaction that comes from doing a task well."'2 4 He goes on to
assert that
[m]ost of these goals, however, are unobtainable except through
cooperative group effort. One naturally would assume, therefore,
that agency behavior would be primarily inner-directed-that is,
explainable largely in terms of the difficult process of mediating
among the conflicting interests of group members-until external
stimuli change in a sufficiently compelling fashion so as to draw a
critical mass of attention outward.25
The collective action problems identified by Langevoort consist
of internal transaction and agency costs. 26 Agency costs are the costs
of monitoring the lower- and middle-level bureaucrats within an
agency. Here the idea is that the goals of top agency officials, which
might well consist of obtaining the greater prestige associated with an
enlarged or preserved turf or budget, or the sense of pride or satisfac-
tion that comes from being associated with an agency that is thought
to be successful at serving public policy, may not be shared by lower-
level officials. The difficulties associated with monitoring these lower-
level officials to cause them to act in ways consistent with the upper
echelons constitute agency costs. Similarly, transaction costs consist
of the costs associated with drafting contracts that create incentives
for lower-echelon personnel to act in ways consistent with the inter-
ests of their superiors.
Those who criticize public choice theory note that these agency
and transaction costs prevent administrative agencies from achieving
or even pursuing external objectives because these costs "operate as a
counterweight to the incentives to maximize institutional utility in ex-
ternal terms" that are described in public choice theory.27 However,
once an agency has become obsolete, particularly when that fact is
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whose objectives would best be served by the demise of the agency,
the collective action problems that might normally diminish the ex-
planatory power of public choice theory disappear because agency
personnel all share the same basic goal: survival. This shared goal of
survival clearly constitutes sufficient "external stimuli" to draw an
agency's attention outward. The shared desire not only to continue to
be able to make a claim for relevance, but indeed for survival itself,
provides a sufficiently strong set of incentives to overcome any of the
collective action problems that affect the behavior of agency personnel
at other times.
B. Indicia of Agency Obsolescence
The purpose of the preceding discussion has been to explain that
the problem of agency obsolescence transcends the rather trivial fact
that administrative agencies tend to waste real resources. As demon-
strated above, the specter of obsolescence affects the nature of the de-
cision-making process within the agency itself. In particular, the
problems of (1) agency imperialism in the form of "turf-grabbing," (2)
agency "capture" by special interest groups, (3) distortion of informa-
tion flow to the public, and (4) manufactured or fabricated crises,
which exist to varying degrees in all agencies at various times, all be-
come more acute when agencies are faced with obsolescence. This is
because the internal transaction and agency costs that normally curb
the natural tendencies toward imperialism, capture, and information
distortion, disappear when an agency is confronted with obsolescence.
Two practical implications emerge from the above discussion.
The first implication is that administrative agencies have powerful
weapons at their disposal with which to deal with their own obsoles-
cence, while there is no obvious mechanism or incentive structure in
place that would cause obsolete agencies to be put out of existence.
The second implication of the above discussion is that it will be diffi-
cult to develop criteria for determining agency obsolescence. Since an
agency can skew information flow when that information is contrary
to its own institutional self-interest, and since the agency is likely to
have powerful constituents with similar incentives to skew informa-
tion flow, it stands to reason that the mere problem of identifying
obsolete agencies, much less responding to the fact of their obsoles-
cence in a public-regarding way, is extremely improbable. Despite the
seemingly intractable problem of agency obsolescence, it seems worth-
while to study administrative agency obsolescence nonetheless for the
reasons discussed above, namely that obsolescence has a strong effect
on agency behavior.
[Vol. 15:909
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With regard to the first implication, agencies' ability to exert
their own regulatory authority in such a way as to benefit certain mar-
ket participants over others means that agencies can retain powerful
support among special interest groups long after they have become
obsolete. Similarly, the ability of administrative agencies to control
their own agendas means that they can seek out new constituencies to
replace old ones that have disappeared. The ability to retain old con-
stituencies and to attract new ones means that agencies will find pow-
erful allies in Congress who will continue to press for an agency to
continue.
Moreover, over time, many organizations and individuals outside
a particular administrative agency will develop in such a way that
their survival depends on the continued success of that agency. For
example, a law firm that specializes in appearing before a particular
administrative agency, or an outside academic who has built a con-
sulting career around his previous association with an agency, will
find their respective economic futures to be inextricably tied with the
future of the agency. Such individuals and groups will constitute
powerful allies for virtually any administrative agency faced with ex-
tinction. For example, when the Administrative Conference of the
United States was threatened with extinction during the congressional
debates over the 1993 Budget Reconciliation Bill, earnest appeals
were made to outside consultants for the agency,28 who, of course,
were eager to provide support.
By contrast, collective action problems of familiar kinds gener-
ally will conspire to prevent the public from galvanizing into an effec-
tive political coalition to do anything about agency obsolescence. The
collective action problems are caused by the fact that all of the bene-
fits associated with driving an obsolete agency out of existence are
spread broadly throughout society. These benefits come in the form
of more coherent regulations, less government waste, and, as dis-
cussed below, better allocation of resources in society. Because of the
widely distributed nature of the benefits associated with discovering
and then doing something about agency obsolescence, it will not be
rational for individual citizens to invest the resources necessary for
dealing with agency obsolescence. This is because the considerable
costs of discovering agency obsolescence and then forming an effective
political coalition to deal with the problems caused by obsolescence
would be highly concentrated among a small group. This group
would realize that its proportional share of the widely distributed ben-
efits it was generating would be far lower than the costs it was incur-
28 The Author of this Article was among those consultants.
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ring in discovering and dealing with obsolescence. This collective ac-
tion problem would lead individuals and groups in normal circum-
stances to be rationally ignorant of the problems associated with
agency obsolescence. Thus, agency obsolescence will not necessarily
lead either to a diminution in demand for an agency existence by spe-
cial interest groups or other organized distributional coalitions, or to
an increase in opposition to an agency among those groups and indi-
viduals harmed by the waste and inefficiency generated by the obso-
lete agency.
The second practical implication of the discussion to this point
concerns the difficulty of determining agency obsolescence. The abil-
ity of administrative agencies, their allies, and their constituents to
generate and control information relevant to that agency makes it dif-
ficult to design systems that can reliably identify obsolete agencies and
respond to that obsolescence in a constructive way. Nonetheless, it is
possible to develop some general guidelines to assist in identifying ob-
solete agencies. First, of course, the discussion above suggests that
obsolete agencies are likely to behave differently from agencies that
are still viable, but perhaps suffering from acute organizational ineffi-
ciency. For example, an agency that is simply experiencing organiza-
tional slack without obsolescence is more likely to exhibit tendencies
toward risk avoidance due to the fact that "agency staffs rarely are
rewarded for their successes . . . but inevitably blamed for publicly
observed failures within their jurisdictions."29 In addition, agency
personnel are likely to exhibit a certain lethargy when obsolescence is
not an issue because agency personnel have no meaningful incentives
to increase output, and in any event, measuring bureaucratic output is
exceedingly difficult to do. For these reasons, during ordinary times,
bureaucrats will be able to consume more leisure than their private
sector counterparts. Finally, one would not ordinarily expect an
agency to make dramatic shifts in its institutional focus during ordi-
nary times. Agencies might make marginal changes in operating
strategies, but sudden efforts to grab additional turf, to toughen en-
forcement efforts dramatically, or to claim the existence of a crisis, are
the peculiar hallmarks of agency obsolescence. In stark contrast is
the ongoing equilibrium displayed by an agency that is responding
primarily to the internal stimuli discussed in the literature on organi-
zational theory.30
Perhaps of greater importance than the general indicia of obso-
29 Langevoort, supra note 18, at 530.
30 See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1986); DOWNS,
supra note 16.
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lescence described above are particular indicia of obsolescence that
will apply to specific instances of agency obsolescence. Up to this
point, the discussion has focused on generic issues of obsolescence
that apply with equal force to all sorts of administrative agencies.
And, while these general indicia of obsolescence are interesting and
important because they demonstrate the general types of problems
posed by obsolescence, such general observations should not obscure
the fact that different factors will cause different agencies to experi-
ence obsolescence. For example, the kinds of exogenous changes in
market structures or technological developments that might render
the Environmental Protection Agency obsolete would obviously be
different from the changes that would render the Securities and Ex-
change Commission obsolete. Thus, attention must be paid to the na-
ture and purposes of each individual agency before a determination of
obsolescence can be made.
It seems fairly obvious that different factors will cause different
agencies to experience obsolescence. What seems more interesting is
the fact that different agencies are likely to respond to their own obso-
lescence in different ways. In particular, differences in agency goals,
functions, constituencies, and even internal cultures will influence, at
least to some extent, the strategies that an agency adopts in the face of
obsolescence. In addition, the nature of the interest groups served by
a particular agency will influence its response. Finally, the presence
or absence of rival agencies performing similar functions and the rela-
tive political strength of those agencies will influence the way that an
agency responds to obsolescence.
II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
The basic causes of all agency obsolescence can be generalized at
some level of abstraction. Specifically, agency obsolescence, like the
obsolescence of firms in the private sector, is brought about by
changes in technology or by the operation of market forces. However,
as the above discussion has shown, the particular market forces or
technological changes that cause obsolescence will differ from agency
to agency. The same is true for firms in the private sector. The forces
that drove buggy whip manufacturers out of business when the auto-
mobile was invented were different from the forces that drove health
spas specializing in the treatment of polio victims out of business
when the polio vaccine was invented.
Thus, different factors will cause different agencies to become ob-
solete. Because the individual characteristics of an obsolete adminis-
trative agency will determine how an agency responds to
1994]
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obsolescence, it is important to examine particular administrative
agencies in some detail in order to gain a more complete understand-
ing of the causes and consequences of agency obsolescence. Similarly,
the social costs associated with agency obsolescence will differ from
agency to agency depending on the nature of the agency's work, and
the strategy it chooses for dealing with obsolescence. Put simply,
some agency obsolescence will impose greater costs on society than
others.
This section of the Article will analyze a particular regulatory
agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, in order to apply
the insights about agency obsolescence developed in the previous sec-
tion to a particular administrative agency. An examination of the ac-
tivities of the SEC over the past decade reveals that this agency is
exhibiting all of the classic, and costly, indicia of an agency that per-
ceives its own obsolescence. In particular, agency imperialism, in the
form of "turf-grabbing," has pitted the SEC against banking regula-
tors and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. The pre-
dictable phenomenon of agency "capture" by special interest groups
has led to subsidies to favored constituencies, particularly securities
analysts, institutional investors,a' market professionals (traders and
market makers), 32 and retail brokerage firms a.3 The distortion of in-
formation flow to the public and the manufacture or fabrication of
crises have been well documented beginning with George Stigler's
classic study of the SEC in which he showed that the Commission
generated "proof" of the need for new regulatory initiatives by gener-
ating a series of case studies showing the existence of thieves and in-
competents in the securities industry. 34 Similarly, the SEC's insis-
tence that foreign companies meet generally accepted accounting
principles in the United States prior to listing on the New York Stock
Exchange has hurt the development of the equity markets without
providing any concomitant benefit for investors.35  However, the
31 See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
21-23 (1981) (arguing that a well-organized special interest group of securities analysts and
institutional investors obtained a regulatory subsidy from the SEC of more than $1 billion
when the SEC required securities issuers to supply data in particular formats that the securities
analysts and institutional investors otherwise would have had to pay to obtain).
32 See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest
Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987).
33 See Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation,
27 J.L. & ECON. 273 (1984).
34 George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964),
reprinted in GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 78
(1975).
35 NYSE Calls for Rule Change to Allow Foreign Listings, Help U.S. Compete, Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 645 (May 1, 1992).
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SEC's insistence that foreign companies comply with these principles
is necessary in order to permit the SEC to cling to the fiction that
mandatory disclosure and reporting rules provide benefits to
investors.
Thus, all of the factors above that were said to become more
acute when agencies are faced with obsolescence are vividly present
with respect to the SEC. The SEC has engaged in agency imperialism
in the form of "turf-grabbing," agency "capture" by special interest
groups, agency distortion of information flow to the public, and
agency manufacture or fabrication of crises. And, as suggested ear-
lier, unique characteristics of the SEC's regulatory agenda have made
the problems associated with that agency's obsolescence particularly
acute. The Securities and Exchange Commission has regulatory au-
thority over the capital formation process. The SEC's drafting, inter-
pretation, and enforcement of its rules determine the process by
which entrepreneurs obtain capital. Because of the SEC's unique po-
sition at the heart of the capital formation process, its response to
obsolescence can impose particularly high costs on society. To the
extent that regulators disrupt firms like bakeries, restaurants, airlines,
or fishing fleets, there may be a distortion in the way that labor, capi-
tal, and other invested resources are used. But when the SEC disrupts
the capital formation process because of inefficient regulations, it dis-
torts the way that resources are allocated throughout society gener-
ally.36 Thus, the inefficiencies caused by the SEC's vigorous response
to its own obsolescence may impose unusually high costs on society.
Historically, the existence of the SEC and its task of enforcing
the federal securities laws could be justified on the grounds that they
provided benefits and protections for the investing public. A succinct
account of the original purposes of the SEC is provided by Phillips
and Zecher in their classic work on the Commission.37 Public opinion
had been swayed in favor of regulation by the stock market crash of
1929. After resisting pressures to regulate for several years, President
Herbert Hoover finally appealed to Richard Whitney, the President of
the New York Stock Exchange, to restrict trading activities and enact
measures to curb the perceived manipulation of securities prices.
When the New York Stock Exchange failed to enact regulatory meas-
ures on its own, a Senate investigation was launched at President
Hoover's instigation. A significant amount of publicity accompanied
this investigation, and numerous headlines about stock market abuses
in the form of fraud, market manipulation, bucket ships, stock water-
36 Cf Tussing, supra note 10, at 146.
37 PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 31, at 8-12.
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ing, and short-selling bear raids played a significant role in the 1932
presidential election between Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt. 8
The 1932 election was thought to have produced a mandate for
regulation. On May 27, 1933, the Securities Act of 193319 was enacted
substantially along the lines Roosevelt had suggested. The Securities
Act of 1933 reflected a decision by Congress to employ a regime of
mandatory disclosure to investors as the cornerstone of its regulatory
philosophy. Congress thought that
disclosure in the glaring light of publicity would provide investors
with sufficient information to be able to make informed investment
decisions that would serve to self-regulate the allocation of capital.
This concept was implemented through the registration of securi-
ties .... The 1933 act had two basic purposes: to provide investors
with sufficient material information to enable informed investment
decisions and to prohibit fraud in connection with the sale of secur-
ities. The disclosure and antifraud provisions of the 1933 act re-
main a central focus of federal security regulation today.4
In other words, regulatory intervention in the form of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 was thought to have been necessitated by the fact that
market forces did not generate the information that investors and
other market participants need to make informed investment deci-
sions. Congress believed that legally mandating the disclosure of cor-
porate information would solve this problem.
In the year following the passage of the 1933 Act, Roosevelt
greatly expanded his regulation of the capital allocation process by
severely restricting the securities business of commercial banks,41 and
strictly regulating insider trading and market manipulation through
passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (or the "Exchange
Act"). 42 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that securities
traded on national exchanges be registered, that issuers file periodic
financial reports on those securities, and that broker-dealers and na-
tional securities exchanges be registered with the SEC. The 1934 Act
also contains antifraud provisions43 and regulations concerning proxy
solicitations, tender offer solicitations," and the power to enforce
margin credit restrictions imposed on brokerage firms by the Federal
38 Id. at 8.
39 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
40 PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 31, at 9.
41 The Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, separates com-
mercial banking from investment banking. See Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
43 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988).
44 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988).
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Reserve Board.45
Interestingly, regulatory authority to implement and enforce the
Securities Act of 1933, whose reporting requirements fell primarily on
issuing companies rather than on financial intermediaries or market
makers, initially was given to the Federal Trade Commission. The
Securities and Exchange Commission was not founded until a year
after the Securities Act of 1933 was passed. It has been said that the
only compromise given to Wall Street as a result of its "massive cam-
paign" against the early congressional versions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 was that regulatory authority over the securities
laws should be removed from the Federal Trade Commission to a
separate administrative agency, which became the SEC.46 While it
has been argued that Roosevelt "seems to have lost little when the
scope and composition of the new commission is examined, '47 over
time the narrower focus of the more specialized agency made it more
susceptible to interest group capture by narrowing the scope and
range of the agency's interests and causing the preferences of its regu-
latory clientele to become more homogeneous.4
It was thought that passage of the Banking Act of 1933, the Se-
curities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would
benefit the capital allocation process by instilling investor confidence
in the banking industry and in the securities markets. Whatever the
merits of this regulatory philosophy sixty years ago, times have
changed. In particular, several important new technologies and re-
cent developments in the financial markets have eroded the need for
the regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion under the auspices of the securities laws. These new technologies
and, market developments also have erased the historic distinctions
between the securities industry and the banking industry. In fact, in
today's modem global banking and securities markets, the very rules
that were thought to help the process of capital formation and alloca-
tion now actually increase the costs of raising capital and harm Amer-
ican industry, particularly for newer, smaller firms.
In an ideal world, the formulation of regulatory policy in the
financial services industry would be informed and guided by economic
45 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1988).
46 PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 31, at 10.
47 Id.
48 For a fuller treatment of the effects of agency structure on agency preferences and per-
formance, see Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Adminis-
trative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992), and Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers
and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671
(1992).
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considerations. Outdated and obsolete regulations would be repealed
and replaced by more relevant laws. But by now, as we all know, this
is not the case. Political considerations guide and inform regulation
in the financial services industry. And, as is so often the case, the
political considerations that guide the regulatory process have led to
substantive policies that are at best nonsensical and at worst amorally
redistributive when viewed from an economic perspective.
As developed in the preceding section, it seems clear that once a
regulatory agency is formed, that agency will deny that it has become
obsolete and will respond to a shrinking demand for its traditional
services by seeking to expand its regulatory turf into other areas.
Thus, to gain a better understanding of recent regulatory trends in the
financial services industry one should look not to the work of financial
economists and specialists in banking and securities, but instead to the
work of economists like James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Wil-
liam Niskanen, who have used the insights of economic theory to gain
a better understanding of the political process.4 9
It is only upon examining this public choice literature that one
can understand the regulatory environment in the financial services
industry. The behavior of regulators in this industry is due to exoge-
nous economic pressures that, left alone, would result both in major
changes in the structure of the financial services industry and in the
need for regulation. However, these economic pressures threaten the
interests of bureaucrats in administrative agencies and other interest
groups by causing a diminution in demand for their services and
products. In response to these threats, pressure is brought to bear for
"reforms" that will eliminate the "disruption" caused by these market
forces.
The net result of this dynamic is as clear as it is depressing. One
observes continued government intervention in the financial markets
long after the need for such intervention has ceased. Such interven-
tion stifles the incentives of entrepreneurs to devote the resources and
human capital necessary to develop new financial products and to de-
velop strategies that assist the capital formation process by helping
markets operate more efficiently.
The dynamic described above applies with great force to regula-
tory issues that concern the securities industry. Developments in the
marketplace deeply threaten the interests of regulators by destroying
49 See JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAU-
CRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
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the pretense that regulators are helping the financial markets work
better.
A. Regulation of the Securities Markets
Historically, the publicly articulated justification for the securi-
ties laws was that market forces did not generate the accurate infor-
mation that investors and other market participants need to make
informed decisions about how to allocate capital. In particular, the
complex disclosure and antifraud rules that govern the behavior of
those who wish to issue securities, launch tender offers or proxy con-
tests, or even simply to communicate with their fellow shareholders,
all spring from the same basic-and outmoded-regulatory philoso-
phy. At its core, this regulatory philosophy assumes that both issuers
and investors benefit from a regulatory system of mandated dis-
closure.
Mandated disclosure was thought to benefit investors because it
provided them with information. Disclosure was thought to benefit
firms and markets by increasing the demand for securities, the basic
operation of the securities markets. Three closely related economic
developments have greatly diminished market demand for the core
functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission. First, as finan-
cial markets have developed, they have become more efficient. In an
efficient capital market, the current price of a security will be the best
estimate of the future price, because the current price will " 'fully re-
flect' all available information" about the future cash flows to the in-
vestors who own the security. 0 Over time, securities markets have
become increasingly more efficient as technology has developed and as
market professionals who compete to find mispriced securities have
emerged in huge numbers.
These market professionals engage in arbitrage in the form of
basic research to locate overvalued securities. Arbitragers, portfolio
managers, investment analysts, brokers, and industry specialists em-
ployed by investment banks "devote their careers to acquiring infor-
mation and honing evaluative skills."'" The buying and selling by
these informed investment professionals ensures that all relevant in-
formation about securities is rapidly transformed into price.
While there is some controversy in the finance literature around
50 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets. A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).
51 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 571 (1984).
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the edges of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, 52 there is virtu-
ally complete consensus about the fact that market forces impound
information sufficiently fast that the arbitrage possibilities presented
by new information disappear incredibly quickly, often in millisec-
onds. 3 As markets have become more efficient, society's need to
devote resources to support a statutory regime of mandatory disclo-
sure designed and enforced by the SEC has disappeared. Any infor-
mation that was supplied by the force of law now is supplied by the
marketplace.
The economic assumptions necessary to operationalize the effi-
cient market hypothesis are simple. Information has value. This
value can be exploited for economic gain by securities traders who (1)
make human capital investment in acquiring the evaluative skills nec-
essary to identify misprized securities, and (2) engage in rivalrous
competition with competing traders to implement trading strategies
that provide profits to the most effective traders while simultaneously
driving securities prices to their correct or efficient levels. Conse-
quently, rivalrous competition among securities professionals drives
securities prices to their efficient levels. The implications of this anal-
ysis are clear. If market forces in the form of rivalrous competition
among market professionals are driving securities prices to their cor-
rect levels, then the regulatory regime of mandatory disclosure, which
comprises the core of the SEC's regulatory mandate, is simply
unnecessary. 4
It is true, of course, that the possibility of fraud continues to exist
even in the most efficient markets. But the opportunities for manipu-
lation and fraud are probably fewer now than at any time in history.
Moreover, rules against fraud existed long before there was an SEC,
and such rules are all that is needed now. Some recent scholarship in
52 Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns, 22
J. FIN. EcON. 3 (1988); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach
to Finance, J. EcON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19.
53 See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons From Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance,
and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017 (1991). As Donald
Langevoort has recently observed, "the recent revisionism in the finance literature criticizes
only the rationality of stock prices. Speed of adjustment (at least with respect to certain types
of information) and the absence of profitable trading strategies remain useful working assump-
tions." Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Effi-
ciency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 857 (1992).
54 Pioneering work arguing against the need for mandatory disclosure was done by George
J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of
Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE
EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21 (N.Y.U. College of Business Ad-
ministration ed., 1974); and Stigler, supra note 34.
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the field of financial economics has emphasized the role played by
unprofessional, uninformed, market participants--dubbed "noise
traders" in the literature-whose activities are thought to play an im-
portant role in the operation of financial markets." Some have
thought that the existence of these noise traders implies a role for the
SEC. The notion is that if the financial marketplace is populated by
two groups of traders, and one group is well informed, and the other
systematically uninformed, then there might possibly be a role for the
Securities and Exchange Commission in protecting these uninformed
noise traders from their better-informed rivals.56
There are at least three critical flaws in this analysis. The first
flaw stems from the simple fact that no market participant is forced
into the role of noise trader. An uninformed trader is only unin-
formed because he chooses not to invest the resources necessary to
become informed. These resources consist of the investment of time
in the human capital skills necessary to evaluate the characteristics of
individual securities, and the time necessary to implement those skills.
Indeed, even those people who lack the natural endowment nec-
essary to develop the evaluative skills necessary to become informed
traders can eliminate the disadvantages caused by asymmetries in in-
formation between themselves and their better-informed trading part-
ners. By purchasing the services of a market professional, such as a
mutual fund manager or investment adviser, even smaller investors
can remove themselves from the ranks of uninformed noise traders,
and, for a fee, join the ranks of the market professionals.17 In other
words, noise traders can opt out. They are noise traders because they
choose to be noise traders. For investors pursuing a "buy and hold"
strategy which involves acquiring a diversified portfolio of securities
as long-term investments and holding them to obtain a market rate of
return, 8 it may be irrational for an investor to "rent" the services of
an informed trader because the costs may be greater than the per-
ceived benefits. Put differently, noise traders may not be acting irra-
55 See Schleifer & Summers, supra note 52, at 19.
56 See Langevoort, supra note 53.
57 Of course, there is nothing wrong with the fact that noise traders must pay a fee to avoid
the consequences of uninformed trading. After all, the market professionals must invest sub-
stantial amounts of time acquiring the human capital required to become a market profes-
sional. No such investments would be made if these market professionals could not command
a fee for their services.
58 Even small investors can obtain a fully diversified portfolio by purchasing shares in one
of the many mutual funds that are designed to mimic broad market indexes, such as the Fidel-
ity Market Index Fund, which mimics the performance of the Standard and Poor's 500. There
generally are no front or back end "loads" charged for investing in such funds, and the annual
fees charged by investment advisers for managing such funds are extremely low.
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tionally. The mere fact that noise traders systematically lose when
trading against their better-informed rivals is not a sufficient basis
upon which to conclude that noise traders are irrational, or that they
are in need of regulatory protection.
As long as noise traders obtain a market rate of return (which
they inevitably will if they own a diversified portfolio of securities and
pursue a strategy of long-term investing), they cannot be considered
irrational merely because their occasional forays into the marketplace
cause them to sell into rising markets or to buy into falling markets.
When noise traders enter the market, they do so for exogenous rea-
sons, having nothing to do with the specific characteristics of the indi-
vidual securities that comprise their portfolios. These exogenous
reasons include changes in a noise trader's individual taste for risk,
changes in preferences for liquidity, or the inevitable need to adjust
the ratio of investment to consumption during different phases of
one's lifetime. Clearly it is not irrational for noise traders to decline
to purchase the services of investment professionals so long as the
anticipated benefits from such purchases in the form of higher returns
on investment is lower than the anticipated costs. These costs will
manifest themselves either in the form of fees to investment profes-
sionals or in the form of the investment in human capital necessary to
acquire the skills necessary to transform oneself into such a
professional.
The second reason why the mere existence of noise traders does
not justify the continued role of the SEC in a world of efficient securi-
ties markets stems inexorably from the first. The reason uninformed
noise traders systematically lose when they trade with market profes-
sionals is that, by hypothesis, such noise traders are less informed
than their trading rivals. But the reason noise traders are not as well
informed as the people with whom they are trading is not that the
information they need to overcome their informational disadvantage
vis-d-vis their trading partners is unavailable to them. Rather, the
information necessary is in the public domain. Uninformed noise
traders simply choose not to invest the resources necessary to acquire
it and to process it into an effective trading strategy. Put differently,
the decision by noise traders to remain noise traders rather than
transforming themselves into informed traders in the ways described
above is identical to the decision of an ordinary consumer to patronize
a convenience store rather than a discount store. The customer pays a
bit more by going to the convenience store, but he saves the inconven-
ience of travelling to the discount store. The uninformed noise trader
is not being "ripped off" any more than the convenience store shop-
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per. The SEC is not necessary to "protect" uninformed noise traders
any more than a regulatory agency is necessary to protect consumers
who choose to shop at convenience stores.
For the past sixty years the SEC has been forcing information
into the marketplace. But it cannot force people to use that informa-
tion. Noise traders do not use the information that the SEC mandates
issuers to disclose because it is not economical for them to use it. Un-
fortunately, like all market participants, noise traders must bear their
pro rata costs of the regulatory burden imposed by the SEC whether
or not they avail themselves of its benefits.
A final point about noise traders that generally goes unrecog-
nized by those who would use them to justify the existence of the SEC
is that the existence of a cadre of uninformed traders is essential to the
proper functioning of a modem securities market. Modem securities
markets are characterized by three types of traders: noise traders,
whose trades are uninformed and whose demand for securities is ex-
ogenous; market professionals who invest resources to become in-
formed about a firm's intrinsic value; and market makers or
specialists who purchase and sell securities in order to clear the mar-
ket and provide liquidity when there are temporary imbalances in or-
der flow.59
Under this basic market microstructure, the existence of some
noise traders whose trading is not guided by superior information is
critical to the basic existence of the market. This is because the exist-
ence of market makers or specialists is necessary to supply the mar-
ketplace with liquidity. But these market makers and specialists
(often called dealers) incur costs in regularizing order flow. These
costs are reflected in the dealers' charges to traders, which come in
the form of the distance, or spread, between the bid and asked prices
that are charged for each transaction. This spread will reflect not
only the costs of maintaining an inventory, including the opportunity
cost of holding a nondiversified portfolio of securities, it also will in-
clude the expected losses incurred when the dealer trades with other
traders.
Dealers are better informed than noise traders. Consequently,
dealers will systematically profit in trades against such noise traders.
In other words, if we "assume that all trading is triggered by idiosyn-
cratic liquidity motives [i.e., noise trading] and that the dealer, ac-
cordingly, is never at a disadvantage because of an asymmetric
distribution of information... [,] the dealer profits from the random
59 See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the
National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315.
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occurrence of liquidity transactions at the bid and the ask." 6 On the
other hand, when market professionals, who are better informed than
the dealer, enter the market, dealers systematically will lose because
informed traders (again, by hypothesis) will never conduct a trade
unless they are buying at a price lower than the (soon to be revalued)
value of the security or selling at a price higher than the (soon to be
revealed) value of the security.6 Thus, market makers and specialists
will be driven out of business if noise traders leave the market because
they will lose money if their only trading partners are market profes-
sionals. Thus, noise traders are essential to a properly functioning
securities market because unless some investors trade for noninforma-
tional reasons, dealers will be unable to survive as suppliers of market
liquidity services.62
Because market makers and specialists make money when trad-
ing with noise traders and lose money when trading with market pro-
fessionals, these professional traders will adjust their spreads to reflect
the probability that any particular trade will be with a professional, as
opposed to a noise trader. The higher the expected probability of
trading with a noise trader, the narrower the spread. The higher the
probability of trading with a market professional, the wider the
spread.
When an order to buy or to sell arrives, the dealer does not know
whether it is from an informed trader [market professional] or
from a liquidity [noise] trader. If it is from an informed trader, the
transaction is not profitable from the dealer's point of view. The
dealer therefore takes the defensive action of increasing the ask
quote and lowering the bid....
The dealer cannot, however, achieve total protection by suffi-
ciently widening the spread. Regardless of how much the ask is
raised and the bid is lowered, any informationally motivated trade,
if it occurs, is at the dealer's expense because an informed public
investor does not seek to trade unless he or she profits from the
63transaction.
Thus, ironically, the SEC ultimately would destroy the very markets
it is supposed to nurture and protect if it ever were to succeed in a
quixotic effort to remove noise traders from the market.
In sum then, the securities markets can be divided into three
60 ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, THE EQUITY MARKETS 399 (1988).
61 See Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1971, at
12; Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, J. FIN.,
Dec. 1983, at 1457.
62 SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 400.
63 Id. at 399.
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structural components: (1) market makers and specialists; (2) in-
formed traders (insiders); and (3) uninformed traders, each with dis-
tinct roles. Market makers and specialists provide liquidity services.
Informed traders, known as market professionals, provide informa-
tion to the market in exchange for the arbitrage profits that come
from locating misprized securities. These informed traders contribute
to the allocational efficiency of the economy by insuring that the capi-
tal allocation process functions properly, thereby causing assets to
flow to their highest valued uses. Finally, there are uninformed noise
traders. Once we see that such traders are not systematically ex-
ploited but are essential to the very existence of the securities markets,
it becomes plain that the SEC has no role in protecting such traders
from abuses that simply do not exist.
The Supreme Court's recent acceptance of the fraud-on-the-mar-
ket theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson I gave official recognition to the
fact that securities markets have come to be efficient. More impor-
tantly, the case evinced a clear understanding that securities investors
trading in efficient markets do not rely at all on SEC-mandated disclo-
sure. Instead, they rely on the efficiency of the market's price-setting
mechanisms. The increased demand for permitting securities to be
sold through shelf registration of the sort permitted under Rule 41565
and the system of integrated disclosure, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, Rule 144A,66 which allows for the free trading of unregistered
securities among institutional investors, also provide strong evidence
of the diminution in need for SEC-mandated disclosure in a world of
efficient capital markets.
The development of superior mechanisms for coping with risk
also deprives the SEC of one of its primary justifications for existence.
Not only does the rise of institutional investors, particularly mutual
funds, enable small investors to hire sophisticated intermediaries, but
these investors have acquired important tools for dealing with risk.
Portfolio insurance, the emergence of a robust market in options
swaps, futures, and other derivative financial products enable inves-
tors to eliminate the very sorts of investment risks that the SEC is
charged with regulating. Put simply, investors' opportunities to
hedge are greater than ever before. And while these hedging opportu-
nities are not costless, the markets are sending a pretty clear signal
that they are less costly and more effective than the dubious regula-
tory alternative provided by the SEC.
64 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
65 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1993).
66 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1993).
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The emergence of significant competition among exchanges and
among competing jurisdictions for the production of efficient legal
rules also has contributed to the demise in demand for the services of
the Securities and Exchange Commission. For example, the decision
by a firm to list its securities, either on the New York Stock Exchange
(or "NYSE"), or on the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations System ("NASDAQ"), or on any smaller, or
regional exchanges reflects a decision to comply with the rules of that
exchange. Even prior to the creation of the SEC, the New York Stock
Exchange had rules requiring outside audits and the submission of
balance sheets and income statements to the Exchange. 67 The exist-
ence of these informal rule-making structures for exchange trading is
a direct substitute for a Securities and Exchange Commission. By list-
ing on an exchange or on an over-the-counter market, a firm makes a
credible commitment to abide by a certain set of rules for the protec-
tion of investors.
The value to a firm of making such a commitment is clear. Only
by making such a commitment could a firm gain access to capital at
competitive prices because a failure to make an appropriate commit-
ment to investors would send a very bad signal. The ability of ex-
changes to impose sanctions, such as fines or delisting, on listing firms
makes the commitment associated with listing credible to outside in-
vestors. One clear advantage of securities laws promulgated by an
exchange over those promulgated by the SEC is that the latter, as a
monopoly, has fewer incentives to innovate and no incentives to cus-
tomize its legal rules to meet the individualized needs of particular
market participants. By contrast, today U.S. stock exchanges engage
in vigorous competition with both domestic and international compet-
itors for listing business. This vigorous competition provides ex-
changes with strong incentives to draft innovative rules that provide
effective protections for investors and ensure low capital costs for issu-
ing firms. When the SEC was created however, it was possible to
argue that few firms could avail themselves of the customized, off-the-
rack legal rules concerning accounting and disclosure because there
were no rival exchanges of consequence, and only the largest, best
capitalized firms were eligible for listing. Moreover, the New York
Stock Exchange was a monopoly for many years, and, as such, it
could be argued that the Exchange needed to come under government
supervision in order to protect it from abusing its monopoly position.
But now the National Association of Securities Dealers (or
"NASD") has emerged as a vigorous rival for the New York Stock
67 Benston, supra note 54.
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Exchange for the listings of all firms, including firms that clearly
would be eligible for listing on the Big Board.68 Moreover, many
smaller firms whose size would prevent them from qualifying for list-
ing on the New York Stock Exchange are now eligible to be traded
under the auspices of the NASD. 69 Thus, all publicly traded firms
can achieve the kind of signalling once provided by the NYSE if they
so choose.70
In addition, since state corporate law in the United States serves
as the basic source for firms' internal rules of corporate governance, it
has the potential to provide a substitute for the SEC to the extent that
rules governing the issuance and trading of securities are necessary.
Indeed, from 1911, when Kansas passed the first state securities law,
until 1933, when the Securities Act of 1933 was passed, state law gov-
erned securities transactions. 71 In her careful studies of the jurisdic-
tional competition for corporate charters, Roberta Romano has
shown that the vigorous competition among states for the revenues
associated with state chartering for corporations not only produces
more efficient corporate law rules than a national system of lawmak-
ing would, but it also produces: (1) corporate law rules that are highly
responsive to changing circumstances; and (2) a cadre of lawyers and
judges with major investments in the human capital necessary to de-
velop the expertise to maintain a sophisticated system of corporate
laws in a rapidly changing business environment.72
Unlike a monopolistic federal agency, states' interests in ob-
taining the significant revenues associated with corporate chartering
drive them to craft efficient corporate law rules to attract such char-
tering business. Moreover,
68 See David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers,
73 VA. L. REV. 701, 732 n.82 (1987).
69 There are an estimated 55,000 publicly traded corporations in the United States. Of
these, approximately 3,500 are traded on the New York Stock Exchange or the American
Stock Exchange, while 4,970 are listed on the NASD's automated quotation system (NAS-
DAQ). The remainder of the stocks are not listed on any exchange or other self-regulatory
organization ("SRO"). RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 634 (7th ed. 1992). Presumably, these firms find that the costs of listing on
an exchange or SRO is too high to justify the benefits. This is certainly understandable for
smaller firms, where there is insufficient trading to justify the costs of formal listing. In light of
the fact that there are positive and often substantial costs to listing, it would be erroneous to
conclude that a failure to list is an indication of untrustworthiness on the part of a corporation.
70 See Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common
Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1987).
71 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 347 (1991).
72 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 235
(1985).
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[e]ven if states do not have the high-powered incentives of tax reve-
nues to compete for the chartering business of [certain] corpora-
tions [such as close corporations] they may still have an incentive
to produce efficacious close corporation codes: there may be spil-
lover effects for their public corporation business, such as develop-
ing a reputation for having a good business climate. 3
Thus, even if a positive role for government in facilitating the
public offering and trading of securities were still necessary or appro-
priate, the existence of substitutes in the form of state legislatures and
private securities exchanges, both of whom have better incentives to
fashion efficient rules than the SEC, suggests strongly that the SEC is
no longer necessary.
A final argument for the obsolescence of the SEC comes from
modern financial theory. In the years since the Roosevelt administra-
tion gave birth to the SEC, financial economists have invented portfo-
lio theory and the capital asset pricing model, which provide investors
with tools for reducing risk far superior to the bureaucratic alterna-
tive offered by the SEC.74 The lessons provided by these cornerstones
of financial theory are now well known and need only be summarized
here. Portfolio theory has provided a better understanding of how
diversification works, not only to reduce risk, but also to eliminate
certain types of risk from the investment process. 75 The capital asset
pricing model explains how the markets value financial assets. The
basic lesson of the capital asset pricing model is that, in competitive
capital markets, investors will receive expected returns commensurate
to their non-diversifiable risk.76
One lesson of modern financial theory is that the risk associated
with owning a portfolio of securities is not related to the particular
risk characteristics of the individual securities in the portfolio. This is
because investors can eliminate such risk through diversification.
Rather, the risks that investors face correspond to the broader market
risk. Thus, there is considerably less demand for the firm-specific dis-
closure rules promulgated and enforced by the SEC than once was
believed.
It would indeed be surprising if the SEC had responded to the
news that it had become irrelevant and unnecessary as a positive force
in the capital markets by quietly going away. Instead, in the time-
73 ROMANO, supra note 72, at 25.
74 See, e.g., Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (on portfolio theory);
William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices.: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of
Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964) (on the capital asset pricing model).
75 See Markowitz, supra note 74.
76 See Sharpe, supra note 74.
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honored way of bureaucrats everywhere, the SEC has responded by
taking actions designed to fabricate new demand for its services.
These actions predominantly involve efforts to expand its regulatory
jurisdiction into new areas and to manufacture or fabricate crises. In-
deed, the modem history of the SEC has been the story of a regula-
tory agency far more interested in inventing problems that do not
exist and expanding its own jurisdiction to restore its relevance than
in protecting the interests of investors or issuers.
Examples of SEC imperialism abound. Indeed, the history of the
SEC over the past decade has been that of an agency seeking to find
continued relevance in a changing world. The costs of that search to
the public have been enormous.
B. Rule 19c-4 and Executive Pay
In 1990, the SEC lost a lawsuit brought by the Business Round-
table to challenge an effort by the Commission to intrude on the abil-
ity of the states to promulgate the rules that affect the internal
governance of their domestically chartered corporations. This suit,
Business Roundtable v. SEC,77 challenged SEC Rule 19c-4,78 which
barred national securities exchanges and national securities associa-
tions (also known as self-regulatory organizations or SROs) from list-
ing the stock of a corporation that takes any corporate action with the
effect of nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing the per share
voting rights of existing common shareholders.79 Rule 19c- 4 was
promulgated by the SEC under the authority of section 19 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, which gives the SEC regulatory au-
thority over self-regulatory organizations.80
Under section 19, SROs must submit any proposed changes in
their rules to the SEC, which must then approve the proposal if it is
found to be consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act and
the regulations thereunder. By forcing a standardization of the rules
regarding disparate voting rights, the SEC tried to use its authority to
eliminate competition among exchanges and states regarding the le-
gality of one-share, one-vote voting requirements."' The SEC took
the position that the statutory language of section 19(c) provided the
agency with the authority to enact Rule 19c-4 .2 This statutory lan-
77 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
78 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1993).
79 Id.
80 See Voting Rights Listing Standards: Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376
(1988).
81 See id. at 26,381-82.
82 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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guage gives the Commission the power to amend the rules of an SRO,
in the absence of a proposal by the SRO, where the change is "neces-
sary or appropriate" to insure the fair administration of the SRO, or
for reasons "otherwise in furtherance of the purposes" of the Ex-
change Act. In particular, the SEC argued that it enacted Rule 19c- 4
in order to better regulate the corporate proxy process by helping to
"ensure fair shareholder suffrage." 3
The Business Roundtable case represents a high point in SEC im-
perialism. In a single stroke the Commission sought simultaneously:
(1) to quash the ongoing battle among the exchanges regarding the
legality of dual class voting stock (which was the primary vector
along which competition among the exchanges was taking place at the
moment); 4 and (2) to assert its ability to supersede traditional state
law prerogatives to govern in this area. Throughout the litigation, the
SEC took what the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit characterized as the "surprising" position that it
retained regulatory authority over virtually all of the internal affairs
of U.S. corporations including requirements for independent directors
and independent audit committees, shareholder quorums, shareholder
approval for certain major corporate transactions, and other matters
traditionally governed by state law. 5 The Court of Appeals declined
to give the SEC authority to usurp the traditional authority of the
states to regulate the internal affairs of corporations, and vacated Rule
19c-4.86
A similar criticism can be levelled against the SEC's efforts to
intervene in the internal management of corporations by forcing cor-
porations to disclose clearer and more detailed information about
compensation of top executives.8 7 The new SEC rules require corpo-
rate boards of directors, the group responsible under state law for
compensation decisions, to disclose the reasoning behind their deci-
sions, and to provide graphical comparisons of a company's stock per-
formance with that of the rest of the industry.
While the new rules regarding compensation may properly be
viewed as mere palliatives, since they do not alter the ability of firms
to pay whatever compensation they deem appropriate, the SEC made
it clear that it took the substantive view that executive compensation
83 Id. at 410.
84 See Fischel, supra note 70 (discussing the value of competition among exchanges and
with the over-the-counter market in this context).
85 See Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412.
86 See id. at 416-17.
87 David S. Hilzenrath, Shareholders Rights Expand: SEC Rules Could Help Curb Execu-
tive Pay, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1992, at Al.
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was too high. In defense of the new disclosure obligations, then SEC
Chairman Richard Breeden told reporters the story of a corporation's
chief executive officer who was awarded stock options that will be
worth $219 million in ten years if the company's stock performance
merely keeps pace with the return on U.S. government securities."8
The new rules regarding executive compensation represent not only
another attempt by the SEC to intrude on state lawmaking power,
they also reflect an effort to make a highly visible appeal to popular
sentiment during an election year when populist sentiment was run-
ning high. Such an appeal, however ill-advised, is perfectly consistent
with the predictions made in this Article regarding the behavior of an
administrative agency confronted with obsolescence.
C. Turf Wars with the CFTC
The litigation over Rule 19c-4 and the executive compensation
controversy are only the most recent in a series of disputes brought
about by the SEC's efforts to expand its regulatory turf. Despite the
fact that the Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")
has "exclusive jurisdiction" over futures contracts under the Com-
modities Trading Act, 9 the SEC has taken the position that futures
contracts involving securities are subject to the jurisdiction of the
SEC. Similarly the SEC has taken the position that trading in futures
contracts on Government National Mortgage Association
("GNMA") certificates and Treasury bills is subject to SEC approval
and not that of the CFTC.9" Similar disputes have taken place over
the issue of who has regulatory authority over trading of stock index
participation instruments. 91
As noted above, such disputes over turf are a classic symptom of
regulatory obsolescence.92 And, while turf wars are common for all
agencies at various times in their existence, what is striking about the
SEC's experience with turf wars in recent years is how frequently they
occur, and how central they are to the Commission's regulatory
agenda.
88 Id. at A18.
89 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (1988).
90 See Collen Sullivan, SEC Asks Takeover of Financial Futures Regulation, WASH. POST,
Feb. 10, 1978, at Fl.
91 Stock index participation instruments are contracts of indefinite duration based on the
value of an index or a basket of securities in which the seller promises to pay the buyer the
value of the index as determined on a previously agreed upon 'cash out day." See Kurt
Eichenwald, U.S. Weighs Role Shifts for Market Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1989, at D2.
92 See supra p. 914.
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D. Turf Wars Against Regulators of Banks and Broker-Dealers
The SEC has also fought battles in recent years with the Comp-
troller of the Currency over the issue of whether it had regulatory
authority over commercial banks' activities as broker-dealers. This
controversy arose when the Comptroller began to allow national
banks to offer discount brokerage services to the public.93 Another
example of the SEC's efforts at turf grabbing involves the Commis-
sion's efforts to grab regulatory authority over the U:S. government
securities markets away from that market's primary regulator, the
Department of the Treasury, in the wake of the recent unpleasantness
in the primary market for those securities.94 The SEC's ill-fated at-
tempts to assert regulatory authority in all of these areas represented
the grasping attempts of an agency without a purpose seeking to hold
onto its budget. Here a bill, strongly supported by the SEC, which
would have given the Commission greater powers to regulate the gov-
ernment securities market against perceived "manipulation" was
voted down in Congress on the grounds that it was "restrictive and
unnecessary.""
Clearly the Department of the Treasury, the agency responsible
for financing the federal government's budget deficit, and which issues
U.S. government securities, should have regulatory authority over the
initial sale and subsequent trading of government securities, since it is
the agency with the strongest incentives to have that market operate
fairly and efficiently. The SEC, by contrast, has no claim of expertise
to regulate the securities issued by the U.S. government since these
securities are free of credit risk, and thus not in need of any benefits
that the SEC's pro-disclosure regulatory regime might offer. Simi-
larly, the SEC's efforts to expand its regulatory authority by requiring
government-sponsored agencies, such as the Federal National Mort-
gage Association, to register their stock and debt securities with the
SEC in the same manner as public companies can only be described as
an effort to expand the Commission's own power in light of the lack
of need for further disclosure from such agencies. 96
93 See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
94 Jonathan R. Macey, The SEC Dinosaur Expands Its Turf, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1992, at
All (referring to SEC activity after Salomon Brothers was implicated in a scandal involving
government securities).
95 Securities Bill Fails, NEWSDAY, Sept. 17, 1992, at 39; see also 138 CONG. REC. H8418-
19 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1992) (statement of Rep. Wylie).
96 Roger Fillion, SEC Chief Engulfed in Controversy Over Politics and Power, REUTERS
Bus. REP., Feb. 7, 1992, at 1.
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E. Loan Participations
Still another manifestation of the SEC's relentless efforts at turf
expansion concerns the Commission's efforts to cause loan participa-
tions sold by commercial banks to be characterized as securities, so
that these investment instruments-and the banks that issue them-
would fall under the SEC's regulatory jurisdiction. The Securities
and Exchange Commission filed an amicus brief in Banco Espanol de
Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank,97 arguing that loan partici-
pations were securities and thus subject to rescission benefits of sec-
tion 12(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.98
As the name implies, a loan participation involves the sale of a
stake in a loan from the commercial bank originating the loan to
other financial institutions or individuals. Loan participations permit
the primary lender to reduce the risks associated with a particular
loan, and allows other investors to reduce the search costs associated
with finding investment vehicles for excess funds.
Often, as was the case in Banco Espanol, the originating bank
assumes no responsibility to purchasers of loan participations if the
borrower's ability to make repayment on the loans were to become
compromised. In Banco Espanol, when the borrower began default-
ing on its loans and entered bankruptcy, prior purchasers of loan par-
ticipations brought suit contending that the loan participations were
securities within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933. The con-
tention that the loan participations were securities permitted the
plaintiffs to claim that they were entitled to rescind their purchase
agreements under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act.99
The Securities and Exchange Commission filed an amicus brief in
the litigation on behalf of the plaintiff banks." If the court had sided
with the plaintiffs and with the SEC in Banco Espanol, it would have
succeeded in extending its regulatory authority beyond the realm of
the securities industry and far into the commercial banking industry.
In light of the vigorous competition in the United States between the
commercial banking industry and the securities industry,"0 ' obtaining
regulatory authority over a portion of the commercial banking indus-
try would have had the effect of strengthening dramatically the Com-
97 See 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992).
98 Amicus Brief of the SEC, Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-7563).
99 See Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 54 (citing section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1988)).
100 See id. at 52-53.
101 See Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function:
The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1 (1984).
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mission's ability to serve its traditional clientele, the investment bank-
ing industry. This newfound ability to provide benefits to its powerful
clientele would have provided a valuable new source of political sup-
port for the Commission.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against the
SEC and the plaintiffs and in favor of the defendant issuing bank."12
The opinion represents a major defeat for the SEC in its relentless
efforts to expand the scope of its regulatory turf into other areas. 0 3
The decision is important because traditionally judges have viewed
the imposition of regulatory authority as providing benefits to market
participants without any concomitant burdens."°4 In fact, allocating
regulatory authority to the SEC over a particular investment vehicle
does impose costs on market participants. These costs come in the
form of higher transaction costs, as trading becomes more expensive
due to increased regulatory burdens and greater risk of legal liability;
higher barriers to entry, as the fixed costs of entering the securities
business increase when the SEC obtains regulatory authority; and less
innovation, because such innovation not only brings with it litigation
risks under securities law, but also requires costly regulatory approv-
als from the Commission.
Thus, the opinion in Banco Espanol reflects the fact that the SEC
has lost considerable prestige in recent years. While lawyers and
judges may not be fully cognizant of all of the technical reasons for
the decline in society's need for the SEC's regulatory services, they are
quite capable of understanding the effects of the regulatory burden
imposed by the SEC on capital formation and entrepreneurship. For
its own part, the SEC took a considerable gamble in Banco Espanol by
risking its prestige in a rather shameless effort to expand its regulatory
turf. The effort was particularly unseemly in light of the fact that the
Comptroller of the Currency, which has regulatory authority over na-
tional banks such as the defendant in Banco Espanol, previously had
issued detailed policy guidelines governing the sale of loan participa-
tion.' °5 Thus, as the Second Circuit observed, the existence of an al-
ternative regulatory scheme "indicated that application of the securi-
102 Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d 51.
103 See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 295, 299 (1946) (units of citrus grove and
maintenance contract considered securities).
104 Judge Oakes's dissent in Banco Espanol reflects this traditional approach ("[T]he major-
ity opinion... makes bad banking law and bad securities law .... "). See Banco Espanol, 973
F.2d at 56 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
105 See id. at 55.
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ties laws [and hence the SEC] was unnecessary."' 10 6
F. Proxy Reform
The SEC recently promulgated important rules that reform the
proxy system in order to make it easier for institutional investors to
communicate with one another."0 7 In addition to the new disclosures
regarding executive pay described above,10 8 these rules make it easier
for institutional investors to communicate with one another for the
purpose of affecting corporate policy. The new rules will allow share-
holders to vote for a combination of management nominees and
outside challengers in board elections. Under prior rules, sharehold-
ers were required to oppose the entire management slate if they
wanted to vote for a single rival. Similarly, the new rules allow share-
holders to oppose a single proposal within a proxy statement without
being forced to oppose the entire package of management proposals.
In addition, the new rules permit shareholders for the first time
to publish their views about a company in the press or the media with-
out prior approval by the SEC. Prior rules, which were generally re-
garded as "cumbersome and costly,"' 1 9 forbade shareholders to
communicate with more than ten other shareholders without getting
advance clearance from the Commission. ° As John Pound has
pointed out, prior SEC rules were so restrictive that they had a clear
chilling effect on investors who wished to bank into an effective polit-
ical coalition to monitor and influence management behavior."'I The
SEC, for example, refused to allow a dissident shareholder to argue
that his company should spend more money on research and develop-
ment on the ground that the dissident shareholder did not have a rea-
sonable basis for knowing the "right" level of such expenditures. 1 2
The SEC even had forbidden firms from asserting that a candidate for
a firm's board of directors is "highly regarded" on the grounds that
the firm did not supply any supporting documentation for its
assertion. 1 3
While the recently enacted reforms to the proxy system do no
106 Id.
107 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(i) (1993); see also Regulation of Communications Among
Securityholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,564, at 29,564-65 (1992); John C. Coffee, The SEC and the
Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (1994).
108 See Hilzenrath, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
109 Robert A. Rosenblatt, SEC Orders Clearer CEO Pay Disclosure, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1992, at A34.
110 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1993).




HeinOnline -- 15  Cardozo L. Rev.  943 1993 - 1994
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
damage to the corporate governance and capital formation processes,
they do not do much good either because they do not go nearly far
enough in encouraging market forces to affect corporate govern-
ance." 4 Proxy battles are a poor substitute for hostile takeovers as
mechanisms for controlling the agency costs that are a natural by-
product of the separation of ownership and management in the large,
publicly-held corporation because the market for corporate control is
a far more efficient corporate governance device than the proxy con-
test system. This is because the gains from winning a proxy contest
must be shared with all of the shareholders in the firm that is the
subject of the proxy battle, while a takeover entrepreneur can capture
all of the gains associated with a successful takeover. Consequently,
when an investor identifies an undervalued firm, that investor will
prefer to launch a takeover rather than mount a proxy contest, all else
equal. The reason so much attention has been focused on the proxy
system is that the market for corporate control has been destroyed by
a combination of ill-considered regulations, including the Williams
Act,' 15 which requires parties to disclose their intentions and qualifi-
cations before making a tender offer.
If the SEC were interested in furthering the public interest rather
than its own regulatory agenda, it would petition Congress to repeal
the Williams Act and to preempt the confiscatory state antitakeover
statutes that undermine the market for corporate control. At the
same time, publicly-held corporations should be permitted to design
whatever internal rules of corporate governance they wish. The firms
that want to make outside takeovers more difficult, either by imposing
share-transfer restrictions or otherwise, should be free to do so. As
takeovers become more costly, the probability that such a takeover
will occur goes down. Thus, each firm's shareholders face a tradeoff
between maximizing the probability of a takeover occurring and max-
imizing the premium they will receive should such a takeover occur.
This decision should be left to the shareholders of each firm to decide
for themselves.
Finally, the revisions of the proxy rules that recently were en-
acted do not go nearly far enough in facilitating the role that institu-
114 Only with the decline of activity in the merger and acquisition market, primarily caused
by the imposition of tough state antitakeover legislation and the decline in sources of financing
for such transactions, has the proxy mechanism emerged as an alternative to mergers and
hostile takeovers as methods for registering dissatisfaction with firm performance or behavior.
See Philip C. Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.:
Where Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corporate Governance Begins, 17 J. CORP. L. 311,
312-13 (1992).
115 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
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tional investors play in corporate governance. As Mark Roe pre-
sciently observed, a few rather obscure rules, when taken together,
effectively deprive institutional investors of an effective voice in mat-
ters of corporate governance. 11 6 Under the Glass-Steagall Act,"1 '
banks are forbidden from owning stock or affiliating with investment
banks that can own stock. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, I8
bank holding companies cannot own control blocks in companies not
closely related to banking. The Investment Company Act of 1940'19
imposes severe taxes and regulations on the entire portfolio of mutual
funds that own blocks of stock that account for ten percent or more of
the shares of public companies. Finally, a series of state laws restrict
the ability of insurance companies to obtain a controlling interest in
public companies. For example, under New York law, life insurance
companies can invest no more than two percent of their assets in the
stock of a single issuer. Forty other states have similar limitations. 20
Thus, virtually all institutional investors with the resources to acquire
enough stock to have a meaningful voice in the affairs of the public
companies in which they have invested are deterred from doing so by
some law or other. The result is that management of the American
public corporation has been separated from ownership far more than
would be the case if market forces were permitted to operate uncon-
strained by regulation.
G. Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990
While most of the above examples describe efforts by the SEC to
expand its own bureaucratic turf by engaging in agency imperialism,
the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990121 illustrates other manifesta-
tions of agency obsolescence discussed earlier. These manifestations
include the distortion of information flow to the public and the manu-
facturing or fabrication of a crisis in order to create the impression
116 Mark Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Compa-
nies, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 7 (1990).
117 Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (current version codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
118 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (current version codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988)).
119 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (current version codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1988)).
120 William McCown & Steven Martinie, State Regulation of Life Insurance Companies, 17
Ass'N LIFE INS. COUNS. PROC. 8 (1988).
121 Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (current
version codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). A succinct description of the Act, and the
events leading to its passage is contained in JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 69, at 632-33.
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that there is a need for the regulatory agency's services when, in fact,
none exists.
Penny stocks are equity securities, generally in highly risky or
speculative companies, that trade at low prices in the over-the-counter
market. The Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 pitted one group, en-
trepreneurs in start-up companies, which has little political power and
almost no access to the SEC, against powerful constituents of the
Commission, namely the organized exchanges and the NASD.
On the bizarre grounds that speculative, high-risk stocks require
greater regulation than other stocks because they impose greater risks,
the Penny Stock Reform Act established a system for more disclosure
and regulatory oversight for the operation of the penny stock market
in the wake of claims of widespread abuses by traders in that bur-
geoning market. In particular, the Penny Stock Reform Act required
dealers in penny stocks to disclose to customers details of the firm's
compensation arrangement for broker-dealers before executing a
penny stock transaction.' 2 2 The Act also requires the preparation of a
"risk disclosure" document detailing the level of risk associated with
a penny stock investment, 123 and that broker-dealers disclose the bid
and ask prices for the stock or comparably accurate and reliable pric-
ing information if bid and ask prices are not available.1 24 The Act
further requires broker-dealers selling penny stocks to supply inves-
tors with monthly statements of the market value of their stock. , 21
The SEC additionally requires broker-dealers selling penny stocks to
issue potential clients a suitability statement containing a determina-
tion by the broker that a particular transaction is appropriate for the
investor in light of his finances and investment goals. 126
The Act also mandates the development of an automated quota-
tion system for penny stocks. This system will collect and distribute
information about penny stocks in a more systematic way than previ-
ously had been done in order to improve the quality of regulatory
surveillance, and to enable market participants to comply with the
SEC's new regulatory requirements.1 27
The Penny Stock Reform Act and the accompanying rules
promulgated by the SEC to implement the Act will have the effect of
impeding the ability of small businesses to raise capital. It will benefit
entrenched SEC constituencies by curbing the migration of order flow
122 15 U.S.C. § 78o(g)(3)(A)(iii) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
123 15 U.S.C. § 78o(g)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
124 15 U.S.C. § 78o(g)(3)(A)(i), (ii) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
125 15 U.S.C. § 78o(g)(3)(B) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
126 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-100 (1993).
127 15 U.S.C. § 78q-2 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
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away from the organized exchanges and towards the relatively unreg-
ulated over-the-counter markets. The differential regulatory burdens
on broker-dealers specializing in penny stocks creates a barrier to en-
try for new investment banking firms attempting to enter the market
by specializing in emerging, high-risk firms.
The lack of information about penny stocks and the low trading
volume in such stocks will make it extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to comply with the terms of the Act. For example, there are clear
economies of scale associated with the use of automated quotations
systems: the greater the volume of trading activity, the lower the per
trade cost of such a system. The requirement that penny stocks use
automated quotation systems is nonsensical in light of the fact that
the low volume of trading activity in such stocks renders such systems
uneconomical. Similarly, the lack of trading activity in penny stocks
will make it exceedingly difficult to comply with the requirement that
customers get accurate information about bid-asked spreads and
monthly price information. For thinly traded, illiquid companies,
such information may simply be impossible to obtain. The reason
that penny stocks are highly speculative, indeed, the reason that they
are penny stocks, is because the market lacks as much information
about such stocks as it has about other stocks. The reason the market
lacks such information is because it is inefficient, that is, too costly,
for market participants to produce such information. The fact that
penny stocks were cheap is a strong indication that investors who
traded in such stocks were not being ripped off: the low prices re-
flected the high risks associated with such stocks, including the risks
associated with a systematic lack of information about such stocks.
In its efforts to obtain stricter regulation of the penny stock mar-
ket the SEC made much use of anecdotal evidence concerning inves-
tor abuses in that market, which created genuine fear that a major
crisis existed in the nation's securities markets, despite the fact that
investors in penny stocks already were protected by a host of state and
federal antifraud rules, including SEC Rule l0b-5. 28 The House
Committee Report explaining the purpose and scope of the Penny
Stock Act was frank in its realization that the new legislation might
kill the penny stock market. The Committee Report noted that
[a]ny contributions that the penny stock market, as it presently op-
erates, makes to the economy, must be weighed against the signifi-
cant economic consequences of the penny stock market's diversion
of $2 billion, which would otherwise be invested in the creation
and expansion of legitimate small businesses. Equally distressing is
128 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
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the loss of investor confidence in the marketplace. 29
Of course, there is no indication of why firms that fund themselves
through the issuance of penny stocks are less legitimate than other
small business. Nor is there any realization of the irony behind a re-
port that simultaneously justifies a statute to control a market so suc-
cessful at raising capital that it is diverting too many resources from
other industries, yet expresses concern about the lack of investor con-
fidence in the marketplace.
The Commission's successful efforts to regulate penny stocks
provide a classic example of an administrative agency seeking to cre-
ate a demand for its own existence by turning an industry into a car-
tel, thereby establishing that industry as a major source of political
support for the agency. The SEC's efforts on behalf of the Penny
Stock Act provided a major service to the established firms and ex-
changes by eliminating their fastest growing competitors-start-up
brokerage firms and market makers providing capital and liquidity to
firms issuing penny stocks.
CONCLUSION
The picture that emerges from all of this is one of the SEC as a
highly politicized organization intent on preserving its own bureau-
cratic turf despite the mounting evidence of its own obsolescence and
irrelevance. The SEC's major litigation efforts and regulatory initia-
tives have been designed to protect the Commission's regulatory turf,
rather than to further important areas of public policy.
By now it is well known that political expediency, not economic
rationality, often drives the policy-making process in Washington.
What is less well understood is how the economic forces that drive
markets alter the preferences of the bureaucrats and the firms they
regulate. Clearly most, if not all, administrative agencies exhibit the
qualities described here as providing the hallmarks of regulatory obso-
lescence. All agencies will engage in imperialism in the form of "turf-
grabbing"; will succumb to "capture" by special interest groups; will
distort information flow to the public to serve their own interests; and
will manufacture or fabricate crises. What may be different about the
SEC is the fact that with the Commission in recent years, this sort of
behavior has not been simply random or opportunistic, but has been a
defining characteristic feature of the SEC. As Edward H. Fleishman,
129 HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, PENNY STOCK REFORM ACT OF 1990,
H.R. REP. No. 617, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990).
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a former SEC Commissioner pointed out shortly after resigning from
the Commission:
The Securities and Exchange Commission has all but extin-
guished the deregulatory attitude prevailing when I arrived in
1986, and the self-restraining and self-critical faculties that are es-
sential to any agency serving the public interest. Since early 1990,
the S.E.C. has turned toward expansion of its jurisdiction and to-
ward imposition of regulatory solutions for market problems that
have no signs of developing.' 30
The purpose of this Article has been to shed some light on the
reasons for this dramatic change in attitude by the SEC. While regu-
lators of other financial intermediaries, such as banks, have continued
to engage in the strategies of risk avoidance and opportunistic imperi-
alism typical of regulatory agencies, the SEC has engaged in a whole-
sale campaign of imperialistic turf expansion. The rationale is that
the banking crisis has provided a continued public interest justifica-
tion for the bank regulatory agencies that saves them from concerns
about their own obsolescence. By contrast, the market forces and ex-
ogenous technological changes catalogued in this Article have obvi-
ated any public interest justification for the SEC that may have
existed. Unlike these other agencies, the SEC must now search for a
new clientele, and seek to provide existing clients with new reasons
for supporting its existence.
130 Edward H. Fleischman, The S.E.C Must Keep on Deregulating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1992, § 3, at 15, col. 2.
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